¹⁹¹ Nemes., ch. 21.

¹⁹² fantastiko/n.

¹⁹³ Or, presented.

¹⁹⁴ See Aristotle, De anima, III. c.7.

¹⁹⁵ Nemes., ch. 71.

¹⁹⁶ Nemes., ch. 9.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid., ch. 8.

¹⁹⁸ chro/n is added in some mss. but wrongly: for it is what is percived by touch alone that is here spoken of, whereas, below, we are told that dryness is recognised also by sight; so also in Nemesius.

¹⁹⁹ Nemes., ch. II.

²⁰⁰ Greg. Nyss., De opif. Hom., ch. 13.

²⁰¹ Text, ai!tion. R. 2930, a0ggei=on.

²⁰² fantasi/a.

²⁰³ kai\ noh/sewj is wanting in some mss., nor is it found in Nemesius, who borrowed his description from Origen.

²⁰⁴ Text, swthri/a. Variant, swrei/a, a heaping up, "coacervatio." Faber has "confirmatio," which is nearer swthri/a, conservatio, which is found in Nemesius, &c.

²⁰⁵ Nemes., ch. 13.

²⁰⁶ to\ fantastiko/n, the faculty of fantasy.

²⁰⁷ Cf. I Cor. i. 10.

²⁰⁸ Max. ad Marin. et ad Incert. p.98.

²⁰⁹ to\ boulhto/n.

²¹⁰ Max. Dial. cum Pyrrh. et Epist. I ad Marin.

²¹¹ Thomas Aquinas (I-2, Quaest. 4, a. I and 2) lays down the position in accordance with John of Damascus, that there is no "counsel" in God quatenus est appetitus inquisitivus, but that there is quantum ad certitudinem judicii. Basil (Hexaem. Hom. I), arguing against the ancient philosophers who taught that the world was made a0proaire/twj, affirms "counsel" in God in the latter sense.

²¹² Max., Epist. I ad Marin.

²¹³ Text, o9 de\ Qeo\j pa/nta ei0dw\j a9plw=j, ou0 bouleu/etai. Various reading is, o9 de\ Qeo\j pa/nta ai9dw\j a9plw=j bou/letai.

²¹⁴ Max., Dial. cum Pyrrh.

²¹⁵ dio\ ou0de\ gnwmiko\n ei\xe qe\lhma.

²¹⁶ gnwmh\n.

²¹⁷ u. infr., lib. iii. ch. 14.

²¹⁸ Or, personalities.

²¹⁹ Text, qelhto/n, as given by Faber. Variant, qelhtiko/n.

²²⁰ to\ gnwmiko\n qe/lhma, the will of individual opinion, or, the dispositional will.

²²¹ Or, acting by opinion, or disposition.

²²² Anast. Sin. in Odhg., from Greg. Nyss., p. 44; Clem. Alex. ap. Max., p. 151

²²³ The Greek e0nergei/a being a term with a large connotation is explained as meaning in different cases operation (operatio), action (actio), and act (actus). Nemesius defines actio a operatio rationalis, actus as perfectio potentiae.

²²⁴ Cf. Anast. Sin. in !Odhgo/j, p 43; John of Dam., Dialect. c. 30; Greg. Nyss., in Maximus, II., p. 155.

²²⁵ pra/ceij. So pra=cij is defined as e0nergeia logikh/ in the following chapter.

²²⁶ ta\ pa/qh. Cf. Instit. Elem., c. 9; Greg. Nyss., Cont. Eunom., v. p. 170.

²²⁷ Max., Dial. cum Pyrrh.

²²⁸ Greg. Nyss. ap. Max., p. 155.