4 This seems to be the force of the phrase if we are to follow Oehler's mss. and read o gar ecoxwtatoj antou qeou. The autoj qeoj of the earlier editions gives a simpler sense. The phrase as read by Oehler certainly savours more of Philo than of Eunomius: but it is worth noting that S. Gregory does not dwell upon this part of the clause as being borrowed from Philo (though he may intend to include it in the general statement), but upon what follows it: and from his citation from Philo it would seem that the latter spoke (not of o ecoxwtatoj qeou but) of o Qeoj pro twn allwn osa gennhta.
8 So in Book I. prwton men thz Prounikou sofiaj ginetai maqhthj, and Book XIII. p. 844 (Paris Edit.). It may be questioned whether the phrase in Books I. and XIII., and that here, refers to a supposed connection of Eunomius with Gnosticism. The Prounikoj Sofia of the Gnostics was a "male-female," and hence the masculine ton paideuthn might properly be applied to it. If this point were cleared up, we might be more certain of the meaning to be attached to the word oktadaj, which is also possibly borrowed from the Gnostic phraseology, being akin to the form ogdoadaj. [On the Gnostic conception of "Prunicus," see the note on the subject in Harvey's Irenoeus (vol. I. p. 225), and Smith and Wace's Dict. Chr. Biogr. s. v. On the Gnostic Ogdoads, see Mansel's Gnostic Heresies, pp. 152 sqq., I70 sqq., and the articles on Basilides and Valentinus in Dict. Chr. Biogr.]
15 The phrase is obscure, anti the text possibly corrupt. To read taj ennoiaj (as Gulonius seems to have done) would simplify matters: but the general sense is clear-that the denial of the existence of time implies eternity.
16 Reading twn mh ufestwtwn, as the sense seems to require. unless we connect twn ufestwtwn with ouk estin. In this case the sense will be practically the same, but the sentence will be extremely involved. The point which S. Gregory desires to enforce is that "not being," or "non-existence," is one and the same thing, whether it is regarded as past, present, or future, and that it is, in any of these aspects, an idea which we cannot without impiety attach to the Divine Person of the Son.
10 This point has been already discussed by S. Gregory in the second and third books. See above. pp. 119, 149. It is also dealt with in the short treatise "On the Faith," addressed to Simplicius, which will be found in this volume.
19 If we might read h for h the sense of the passage would be materially simplified:-"His life is temporal, that life which operates only for the present time, whereon those who hope are the objects of the Apostle's pity."
26 If the property of not being begotten is "associated with" the essence, it clearly cannot be the essence, as Eunomius elsewhere maintains it to be: hence the phrase which he here adopts concedes S. Gregory's position on this point.